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Abstract
The United Nations Security Council has become a crucial
actor in international counterterrorism by not only spurring
the taking of preventive and suppressive measures against
terrorist individuals and groups, but also by taking actions
against states that are said to stand in the way. The Security
Council's actions against such states invariably arise from
accusations by other states, such as accusations of refusal to
extradite suspects of terrorism or responsibility for support-
ing terrorists. Meanwhile, most such issues of dispute are
covered under international treaties relating to terrorism,
which provide for political (negotiation) and judicial (arbitra-
tion and adjudication) mechanisms of dispute settlement.
The Security Council's actions against states in connection
with terrorism, therefore, involve (explicit or implicit) factual
and legal determinations that affect the legal positions of
the disputing states under the applicable international trea-
ties relating to terrorism. The point of departure of this
paper is that, in this respect, the Security Council effectively
becomes an alternative to the treaty-based dispute-settle-
ment mechanisms. The article centrally contends that the
Security Council effectively acts as a more attractive alterna-
tive to treaty-based dispute-settlement mechanisms for pur-
suing terrorism-related (legal) disputes between states,
without providing a meaningful platform of disputation that
is based on equality of the parties. And the Security Coun-
cil's relative attractiveness, arising from the discursive and
legal superiority its decisions enjoy and the relative conven-
ience and expediency with which those decisions are deliv-
ered, entails the rendering of resort to treaty-based dispute-
settlement mechanisms of little legal consequence. The
point of concern the article aims to highlight is the lack of
platform of disputation some states are faced with, trapped
between a hostile Security Council that makes determina-
tions and decisions of legal consequence and an unhelpful
treaty-based dispute-settlement mechanism.
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1 Introduction
In December 2009, the United Nations Security Coun-
cil (hereinafter also ‘the Council’) imposed financial,
travel, and military sanctions and embargoes against the
government of Eritrea, claiming that the latter provides
support to armed groups that are engaged in ‘destabilis-
ing activities’ in Somalia.1 Targeted sanctions were
imposed against the political leaders of Eritrea that were
implicated in ‘harbouring, financing, facilitating, sup-
porting, organizing, training, or inciting individuals or
groups to perpetrate acts of violence or terrorist acts
against other States or their citizens in the region’2
(emphasis added). The main armed group Eritrea was
accused of supporting was an Al-Qaeda affiliate known
as Al-Shabaab, which is designated by most neighbour-
ing States and international actors as a terrorist group
and spoiler of the Somalia peace process.
The support to terrorism that Eritrea and its political
leaders were accused of are covered under different
international treaties relating to terrorism, the most
obvious example being the 1997 Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist
Financing Convention), which provides dispute-settle-
ment mechanisms. Most of the international treaties on
terrorism, including the Terrorist Financing Conven-
tion, were by then not ratified by Eritrea, and in any
event the infant Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) of Somalia was yet not settled enough to engage
in international legal confrontation with Eritrea. Lack-
ing these ingredients, the taking of action through the
political channels of the Security Council may appear as
the only choice.
Now, consider a hypothetical scenario where Somalia’s
TFG is fully installed and stable, and both Somalia and
Eritrea have become parties to all relevant international
1. SC Res. 1907, 23 December 2009.
2. Id., para. 15(d).
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treaties on terrorism including the Terrorist Financing
Convention. Under this scenario, there are two forums
through which Somalia can confront Eritrea for its
alleged support to the terrorist groups in Somalia: the
dispute-settlement mechanisms provided by the Terror-
ist Financing Convention or the UN Security Council.
In this article, an actual instance resembling this hypo-
thetical scenario – a dispute between Libya and three
Western states (the US, the UK and France) in connec-
tion with the terrorist explosion of a passenger aircraft
in Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 – will be used to show-
case and compare the respective roles of the Security
Council and the different international treaties on ter-
rorism in addressing inter-state disputes. The core con-
tentions of the article are as follows. The Security
Council effectively acts as a more attractive alternative
to treaty-based dispute-settlement mechanisms for pur-
suing terrorism-related (legal) disputes, without provid-
ing a meaningful platform for disputation that is based
on the equality of the parties. The Security Council’s
relative attractiveness, arising from the discursive and
legal superiority its decisions enjoy and the relative
expediency with which those decisions are delivered, in
turn renders resort to treaty-based dispute-settlement
mechanisms of little legal consequence. As a result,
states that do not command sufficient political support
at the Security Council are doubly disadvantaged as
they face a hostile political mechanism and an unhelpful
legal remedy.
The article unfolds as follows. I will first (in Section 2)
briefly contrast the Security Council system with the
treaty-based dispute-settlement system from the per-
spective of the characterisation of disputes the two sys-
tems entail, specifically with respect to the place of the
notion of the ‘international community’ therein. Flow-
ing from and reinforcing this broad contrast, I will (in
Section 3) elucidate certain legal and practical consider-
ations pertaining to the functioning of the two systems
in asserting the attractiveness of the Security Council
system. Then (in Section 4), I will assess whether an
even platform for inter-state disputation could be found
within the Security Council itself, to compensate for the
curtailed role of the treaty-based dispute-settlement
mechanisms. This section looks into the working proce-
dures of the Security Council and its counter-terrorism
subsidiary bodies and finds little possibility for enter-
tainment of inter-state disputes in such a manner that
outcomes would be based on the weighing of the con-
testing claims of parties to a dispute. Lastly (in Section
5), I will summarise the main arguments and conclude
by briefly highlighting the significance of the central
problem in the context of the political climate that fol-
lowed the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
2 Terrorism-Related Disputes
Under Treaty-Based
Dispute-Settlement System
and the Security Council
System: Elaboration and
Contrast
On the basis of official United Nations records, current-
ly there are eighteen international treaties relating to
different acts of terrorism.3 All of these treaties contain
similar provisions stipulating the dispute-settlement
processes to be followed in case of disagreement on their
interpretation or application between the states parties.
This common provision reads as follows:
Any dispute between two or more States Parties con-
cerning the interpretation or application of this Con-
vention which cannot be settled through negotiation
within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of
them, be submitted to arbitration. If, within six
months of the date of the request for arbitration, the
parties are unable to agree on the organization of the
arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dis-
pute to the International Court of Justice, by applica-
tion, in conformity with the Statute of the Court.4
State parties, therefore, are required to negotiate as a
first resort towards settling disputes that arise from the
interpretation or application of the treaty. When one of
the negotiating parties deems ‘reasonable time’ has
passed while negotiating on the matter without agree-
ment or while making effort to initiate negotiations, that
state party is entitled to submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion. The parties in dispute must agree on the composi-
tion and terms of the arbitration, failing which, subject
to the time frame mentioned in the article above, any of
the parties would be entitled to submit the matter to the
3. The eighteen treaties are the 1963 Aircraft Convention, 1970 Unlawful
Seizure Convention, 1971 Civil Aviation Convention, 1973 Diplomatic
Agents Convention, 1979 Hostages Convention, 1980 Nuclear Materi-
als Convention, 1988 Maritime Convention, 1988 Fixed Platform Proto-
col, 1988 Airport Protocol (extends and supplements the 1971 Civil Avi-
ation Convention), 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention, 1994 UN Per-
sonnel Convention, 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention, 1999 Terrorist
Financing Convention, 2005 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, 2005 Pro-
tocol to the 1988 Fixed Platform Protocol, 2005 Protocol to the 1988
Maritime Convention, 2010 Protocol to the 1970 Unlawful Seizure
Convention and 2010 New Civil Aviation Convention. Generally, visit
the UN Counter-Terrorism website, <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/
instruments.shtml> (last visited 30 Aug. 2013). It is important to note
that the international legal framework on terrorism extends beyond
these eighteen treaties, incorporating numerous regulatory instruments
(such as UN resolutions and international ‘standards’). My discussion
here is restricted to the eighteen core international treaties as only they
contain proper stipulations for dispute-settlement mechanisms.
4. See, e.g., Art. 24 Aircraft Convention of 1963, Art. 12 Unlawful Seizure
Convention of 1970, Art. 14 Civil Aviation Convention of 1971, Art. 13.
Diplomatic Agents Convention of 1973, Art. 16 Hostages Convention
of 1979, Art. 24 Terrorist Financing Convention of 1997 and Art. 20
New Civil Aviation Convention of 2010.
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International Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘ICJ’, or ‘the
Court’), which would deliver the final decision on the
dispute.
Parallel to the dispute-settlement mechanisms provided
by the different treaties on terrorism runs the United
Nations Security Council system, the chief international
regime for matters of international peace and security.
Inter-state disputes relating to terrorism could be dealt
with by either the treaty-based dispute-settlement
mechanisms or the Security Council system; but the two
systems operate in radically differing discursive and
legal domains and as a result characterise such disputes
differently. An important divergence in the characteri-
sation of disputes between the two systems concerns the
determination of the stakeholders involved: treaty-based
dispute-settlement mechanisms characterise disputes as
essentially matters of contestation between the specific
disputing states, while the Security Council system
brings the ‘international community’ to the centre-stage
of disputes and characterises inter-state disputes as con-
frontation between rogue actors and the international
community, and not as competing claims between
equals.5 I will elaborate these two observations below.
2.1 Characterisation of Disputes Under Treaty-
Based Dispute-Settlement Mechanisms
Although most of the treaties on terrorism characterise
their subject matter as being of concern to the ‘interna-
tional community’ in their preambles, this does not
translate into operational provisions recognising the
international community as a stakeholder or providing it
with an entitlement to be involved in the dispute-settle-
ment process. Of course, the operational provisions of
treaties would not be expected to bestow concrete rights
and obligations on an abstract category such as the inter-
national community per se. This, rather, would have tak-
en place by way of assigning roles to international bodies
that are bestowed with global responsibilities, hence
presumed to represent the interests of the international
community as a whole. A primary example of such
international institution, in relation to the issue of inter-
national peace and security, is the United Nations, and
5. For a critical and historical account of the usage of the indeterminate
notion of ‘international community’, see M. Koskenniemi, ‘“Internation-
al Community” from Dante to Vattel’, in V. Chetail and P. Haggen-
macher (eds.), Vattel’s International Law from a XXI St Century Per-
spective/Le Droit International de Vattel Vu Du XIe Siècle (2013), at
49-76. Further on the problem of indeterminacy in international law,
see M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of Interna-
tional legal Argument (2005) (reissue with epilogue); M. de Hoon, ‘Col-
lateral Damage from Criminalizing Aggression? Lawfare Through
Aggression Accusations in the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict’, 5 European
Journal of Legal Studies 1, at 40-61 (2012). For more on ‘community
interest’ in international law, see B. Simma, From Bilateralism to Com-
munity Interests in International Law (1994), Collected Courses of the
Hague Academy of International Law/Recueil des Cours; S. Villalpando,
‘The Legal Dimension of the International Community: How Communi-
ty Interests are Protected in International Law’, 21 European Journal of
Int’l Law (EJIL) 2, 387-419 (2010); C. Tomuschat, ‘The International
Community: Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their
Will’, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law
241 (1993). DOI:10.1163/ej.9780792329541.195-374.2, last accessed
16 August 2013.
particularly its Security Council.6 A less inclusive form
of involving the international community in the resolu-
tion of a dispute between two states parties could be the
bestowment of a dispute-settlement role on (the assem-
bly of) all state parties to a treaty, particularly when
such treaty enjoys (near) universal membership. For
example, the Statute of the International Criminal
Court provides that disputes relating to the interpreta-
tion or application of the treaty ‘which is not settled
through negotiations within three months of their com-
mencement shall be referred to the Assembly of States
Parties’7 – a body composed of all the states parties to
the Statute as voting participants and some non-state
parties as observers.8
No such arrangement is included in the treaties on ter-
rorism. The first resort, negotiation, involves only the
disputing states parties;9 any agreement the disputing
states parties reach between themselves would be a
legally acceptable conclusion of the dispute, with the
caveat, of course, that such agreement has to be consis-
tent with states’ obligations under other treaties and
general international law. The second and third resorts,
arbitration and adjudication by the ICJ, also generally
involve only the disputing states parties. Arbitration
gives even more autonomy to the disputing parties than
the ICJ as its composition and terms of organisation are
decided exclusively and on an ad hoc basis by the disput-
ing states parties, thus whether and how interests other
than those of the disputing parties would be given con-
sideration in the process is decided exclusively by the
disputing parties. Given that arbitration provides the
disputing parties with even more autonomy than the ICJ
proceeding, the following observation that the inter
partes procedure at the ICJ gives little room for consid-
eration of the interests of the international community is
a fortiori applicable to arbitration.
As regards the ICJ, Article 62 of the Statute of the
Court states that third parties may request permission to
intervene in a judicial proceeding only when they claim
6. Member states of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security
Council ‘the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security’ and have agreed ‘that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’ Art.
24(1) UN Charter. It should also be noted that this responsibility is pri-
mary, but not exclusive. The General Assembly also bears similar, albeit
secondary, responsibility. See Arts. 10-12 UN Charter.
7. Art. 19 the Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998.
8. Observer states are those that have signed the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court or the Final Act of the International Criminal Court
of 17 July 1998, Art. 112(1) the Statute of the International Criminal
Court.
9. Although exchange between states on a dispute at the United Nations
General Assembly had been accepted by the ICJ once as amounting to
negotiations, this decision is not widely received by jurists both inside
and outside the court. The ICJ itself has added that exchanges conduct-
ed at open multilateral forums, although constituting a form of negotia-
tion, are not sufficient to satisfy the legal criteria of negotiation. Wheth-
er or not exchanges at multilateral forums constitute negotiation for the
purposes of the law is question yet to be conclusively answered. See,
J.G. Merills, International Dispute Settlement (2005), at 11-13; dissent-
ing opinions of Judge Spender and Judge Fitzmaurice, in ‘South West
Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Prelimi-
nary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962’, ICJ Report, 1962, p.
319.
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to have ‘an interest of a legal nature which may be affec-
ted by the decision in the case’. Article 63 of the Statute
also gives the right to third states to intervene in a pro-
ceeding involving other states if the proceeding relates
to ‘the construction of a convention’ that the third states
are parties to. The amended Rules of the Court further
allow for an international organisation that is a party to a
multilateral convention to ‘submit its observations on
the particular provisions of the convention the construc-
tion of which is in question’.10 These provisions, in
principle,11 open the door to all states and international
organisations that are parties to a multilateral treaty to
participate in proceedings before the ICJ concerning the
interpretation and application of that treaty.12 However,
under both Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute of the ICJ,
the participation of third (states) parties only implies the
recognition of the interests of those that are specifically
linked to the dispute and not that of the wider ‘interna-
tional community’. In the case of Article 62, the exist-
ence of an ‘affected interest’ is an explicit pre-requisite
for intervention (see quote from the article above). In
the case of Article 63, only those states that have a con-
tractual link to the subject of dispute are invited to par-
ticipate.13 Even then, there may be differentiation
among states parties to a multilateral convention as the
ICJ’s construction of a multilateral convention binds
only those states parties that actually participated in the
Court’s proceeding as parties. This does not make a
meaningful difference in practice, but nevertheless goes
to show the exclusively inter partes design of proceed-
ings at the ICJ and the insignificance of external consid-
10. Art. 43(2) Rules of the International Court of Justice, as amended on 29
September 2005.
11. With regard to states parties, the ICJ has on one occasion rejected such
intervention, which indicates that ‘article 63 does not grant an “auto-
matic” or “absolute” right to intervene.’ M.G. Rubio, ‘Intervention
before the International Court of Justice: the Nicaraguan Intervention in
El Salvador/Honduras case’, I Mexican Yearbook of International Law,
at 165-195, 170 (2001). (This decision of the ICJ has come under criti-
cism, primarily for blurring the distinction between Arts. 62 and 63 of
the Statute of the Court). Concerning international organizations, Art.
43(2) of the Rules of the Court makes such participation, and apparent-
ly even the privilege of notification provided under Art. 63 of the Stat-
ute of the Court, contingent on the discretion of the Court. See, S.
Rosenne, Procedure in the International Court: A Commentary on the
1978 Rule of the International Court of Justice (1983), at 99-101.
12. Giorgio Gaja argues that the possibility for third states to submit obser-
vations to the ICJ based on Art. 63 should also be interpreted so as to
allow states to intervene when a case relates to the interpretation of not
only a treaty, but also a general international law rule, and thereby
bring in the ‘common interests of the international community’ in such
interpretation. See, G. Gaja, ‘A New Way for Submitting Observations
on the Construction of Multilateral Treaties to the International Court of
Justice’, in U. Fastenrath, R. Geiger, D-E. Khan, A. Paulus, S. von Schor-
lemer and C. Vedder (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest:
Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (2011).
13. The participation of international organizations based on Art. 43 of the
Rules of the Court is limited submitting observations and does not
include becoming a party to the proceeding.
erations such as the interest of the international com-
munity.14
In sum, the dispute-settlement mechanisms of the trea-
ties on terrorism exclude non-disputing states, and
states whose interests are not affected (either independ-
ently or through the construction of a multilateral trea-
ty), from the equation of the dispute and aim for the
resolution of the dispute as much as possible by the dis-
puting states parties only (negotiation) and, if not,
through impartial third parties (arbiters or judges). By
so doing, the treaties characterise disputes as matters of
contesting claims between equals.
2.2 Characterisation of Disputes Under the
Security Council System
An intervention of the Security Council in inter-state
dispute, in contrast, is presumed to carry the weight of
the ‘international community’, and thereby transform
the nature of the dispute into one where one or all sides
in the dispute become poised not only against the other
state but also against the rest of humanity. In line with
this, the Security Council is bestowed with authority to
intervene in (almost) any dispute and take (almost) any
measure therein. Whether in its capacity as a dispute-
settlement body according to Chapter VI of the Charter
of the United Nations (hereinafter ‘the Charter’) or in
its enforcement powers under Chapter VII, the Security
Council acts as a representative of the international
community and with an entitlement to intervene in
inter-state disputes without the consent of the disputing
parties. The Security Council is mandated to take part
in the peaceful settlement of disputes – at its own dis-
cretion or upon the request of the state parties in a dis-
pute or other states – by way of calling the disputing
state parties to resort to peaceful dispute-settlement
mechanisms,15 conducting investigations,16 and making
recommendations towards such end.17 When the Coun-
cil exercises its enforcement powers, contrary to the
norms of treaty law, even non-members of the United
Nations would be subjected its authority ‘so far as may
be necessary for the maintenance of international peace
and security’.18
In executing its mandate, the Security Council is not
constrained by the specific treaties that may govern the
matter in dispute. Granted, when exercising its dispute-
settlement functions under Chapter VI, Article 36 of the
Charter states the Security Council is particularly
required to ‘take into consideration any procedures for
the settlement of the dispute which have already been
14. In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, Judge Weeramantry highlighted
that the inter-partes procedure at the ICJ becomes problematic when
dealing with international rules affecting ‘the greater interests of
humanity and planetary welfare’. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, at 7, Separate Opin-
ion of Vice-President Weeramantry, at 117-118.
15. The Council may call states concerned to settle their disputes through
‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice’, Art. 33(2) UN Charter.
16. Art. 34 UN Charter.
17. Arts. 36-38 UN Charter.
18. Art. 6 UN Charter, see also Art. 32.
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adopted by the parties’. Furthermore, the Security
Council is expected to encourage states to resolve their
disputes using legal and political peaceful dispute-settle-
ment mechanisms, including at regional level19 and to
take into consideration that ‘legal disputes should as a
general rule be referred by the parties to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice’.20 This appears to create a har-
monious link between the dispute-settlement arrange-
ments provided by the specific treaty regimes and the
Security Council system. When, for example, disputes
relating to terrorist bombing arise between states parties
to the 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention, the Securi-
ty Council, when seized of the matter, is required to
make efforts towards bringing the disputing parties
towards negotiation, arbitration, or adjudication by the
ICJ, as the Convention stipulates.21
This harmony, however, goes only so far. According to
Article 37 of the Charter, the Security Council is
authorised, when it deems that the dispute is ‘likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security’, to decide ‘whether to take action under Article
36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may
consider appropriate’22 (emphasis added). Article 36, as
mentioned above, stipulates that the Security Council
should operate within the legal framework applicable
between the parties and as a general rule encourage the
parties to prioritise referral of legal disputes to the ICJ.
Therefore, following Article 37, the Security Council is
at liberty to decide to no longer be bound by the param-
eters of the legal framework at stake or any agreement
between the disputing parties, but only with the ‘neces-
sities’ of international peace and security. The Security
Council enjoys even more discretion once it determines
that the situation at hand constitutes ‘threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ in
accordance with Article 39 of the Charter: the Council
can take all necessary measures without being constrain-
ed by the specific treaty regime governing the matter of
dispute.23 This is so widely accepted that the current
debate among international law scholars is whether the
19. Art. 33 UN Charter.
20. Art. 36(3) UN Charter.
21. Art. 20(1) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombing, adopted on 12 January 1998.
22. Art. 37(2) UN Charter.
23. Arts. 41 and 42 UN Charter.
Security Council is bound by the most fundamental
norms of international law (further discussed below).24
The weight of ‘international community’ that a Security
Council intervention entails, and the resulting charac-
terisation of disputes, is better appreciated when con-
trasted with treaty-based dispute-settlement mecha-
nisms. Take, for example, two state parties to the 1970
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (Hijacking Convention)25 entering into a dis-
pute, one requesting for and the other refusing the
extradition of suspects of a particular hijacking incident.
When the stage of negotiation bears no fruit and the dis-
pute appears before an arbitral or judicial forum, both
claims in the dispute (i.e. the request and the refusal of
extradition) would be regarded as mere competing
claims. This means that there is a possibility for the
request of extradition to be found unwarranted (e.g. for
lack of jurisdiction) or for the refusal of extradition to be
found lawful (e.g. priority of jurisdiction). If the refusal
of extradition is found unlawful, it may, nonetheless, be
justified by resorting to the grounds that preclude
wrongfulness under general international law (say, e.g.,
necessity, or as countermeasure for the requesting
states’ previous violation of obligations). Even when the
refusal of extradition is found unlawful and unjustifia-
ble, it is framed only as a ‘non-fulfillment of treaty obli-
gations’. This framing contrasts with that which would
be used in the Security Council system to describe the
same scenario. If the Security Council condemns the
state party that refused to extradite the suspects, the
‘guilty’ party would not be a mere violator of treaty obli-
gations, but also a ‘threat to international peace and
security’, a rogue; and such party would be obliged to
grant the request of extradition not only out of its treaty
obligations, but also out of regard for the interests of the
international community, for which the Security Coun-
cil is regarded a custodian – whether or not the disput-
ing states have given recognition to this custodianship,
by way of signing the Charter.26
24. The most assertive proposition in this debate regards the Security Coun-
cil as bound by the Charter itself, peremptory norms of international
law, fundamental human rights, and also general international law.
While the restrictive proposition regards only the Charter and peremp-
tory norms of international law applicable. See, e.g., E. de Wet, The
Charter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (2004); D.
Akande, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is
there Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of
the United Nations?’, 46 Int’l. & Comp. L. Q. (1997) 309; J. E. Alvarez,
‘Judging the Security Council’, 90 Am. J. Int’l. L. (1996S) 1; V. Gowl-
land-Debbas, ‘The Relationship between the International Court of Jus-
tice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case’, 88 Am.
J. Int’l. L. (1994) 643; ‘Is the Security Council bound by Human Rights
Law?’, 103 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting-American Society of
International Law, 2009; K. Roberts, ‘Second-Guessing the Security
Council: The International Court of Justice and its Powers of Judicial
Review’, 7 Pace Int’l. L. Rev. (1995) 281.
25. Adopted on 16 December 1970.
26. Combined reading of Arts. 2(6) and 32 of the UN Charter.
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3 The Weakening of Treaty-
Based Dispute Settlement on
Terrorism: the Case of Libya,
1992
A scenario resembling the above hijacking example has
in fact taken place in connection with the explosions of
the American Pam Am airline’s flight 103 in Lockerbie,
Scotland, in 1988, and that of the French airliner UTA
flight 772 in Niger in 1989. A large number of Ameri-
can, British and French citizens were among those killed
in the explosions of the two flights; and these three
states conducted investigations, the results of which
implicated Libyan state operatives in both incidents. In
particular, two Libyan nationals – Abdelbaset al-Megra-
hi and Lamin Khalifah Fhimah – were sought by the
US and the UK for criminal prosecution. The US and
the UK then demanded that ‘Libya must:
– [Demand 1] Surrender for trial all those charged
with the crime; and accept responsibility for the
actions of Libyan officials;
– [Demand 2] Disclose all it knows of this crime,
including the names of all those responsible, and
allow full access to all witnesses, documents and
other material evidence, including all the remain-
ing timers;
– [Demand 3] Pay appropriate compensation.’27
The explosions of both Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 were
said to have occurred as a result of the explosive materi-
als placed in the aircrafts by operatives linked to and
directly coordinated by Libyan intelligence officials.
Accordingly, both incidents under the stipulations of
the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (the Montreal
Convention),28 Article 1 of which states:
Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and
intentionally:
…
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to
such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or
which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
27. Letter dated 20 December 1991 from the Permanent Representative of
the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary General, A/46/826, S/23308. France has also made demands
relating to Libya’s cooperation for the criminal proceedings being
undertaken in France, and the Security Council has also endorsed those
demands along with those of the US and the UK. The focus here is on
the demands by the US and the UK as those contained specific requests
(France generally requested that Libya cooperate by facilitating con-
tacts, handing over evidence etc.), and because those were the ones
that eventually led to a contentious case before the ICJ, as will be dis-
cussed below.
28. Adopted at Montreal, on 23 September 1971.
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in serv-
ice, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance
which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause
damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to
cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its
safety in flight;
…
When Libya refused to immediately comply with their
demands, the US, the UK and France took the matter
to the Security Council, which endorsed their demands
and adopted a non-Chapter VII (thus not binding) reso-
lution – Resolution 731 – requesting Libya ‘immediately
to provide a full and effective response to those
requests’.29 The resolution stayed clear of any mention
of the Montreal Convention and framed the issue
entirely in terms of the policy goal of the ‘elimination of
international terrorism’.30 The message was that the
matter was not of ‘mere’ inter-state dispute but one of
interest to the international community, and hence not
to be confined within the bounds of whatever legal
scheme was applicable between the states involved.
Libya resorted to the ICJ and instituted separate but
identical proceedings against the US31 and the UK32
(the ‘Lockerbie cases’) in which it specifically protested
the request for the extradition of its two nationals
(demand 1, see above) as unlawful. The Lockerbie cases
have been the subject of intense debate in international
legal scholarship,33 and so I do not intend to rehearse or
engage in this debate here; it suffices to highlight that
Libya’s fundamental premise was that its dispute with
the Respondents on the extradition of the suspects falls
under the Montreal Convention, which provides for the
29. Para. 3, SC Res. 731, 21 January 1992.
30. Preamble and para. 3, SC Res. 731, 21 January 1992.
31. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United States), Application Instituting Proceedings, 3
March 1992.
32. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Application Instituting Proceedings, 3
March 1992.
33. See, e.g., D.D’Angelo, ‘The “Check” on International Peace and Securi-
ty Maintenance: The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review
of Security Council Resolutions’, 23 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. (2000), at
561; E. Zubel. ‘The Lockerbie Controversy: Tension Between the Inter-
national Court of Justice and the Security Council’, 5 Annual Survey of
International & Comparative Law 1 (2010): Art. 10; W.M. Reisman,
‘The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations’, Yale Faculty Scholar-
ship Series, Paper 866, available at < http://digitalcommons .law.yale
.edu/fss_papers/866 > (last visited 25 Aug. 2013).
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settlement of disputes ultimately through the ICJ.34
Substantively, Libya argued, correctly, that there is no
obligation to extradite suspects (and certainly not one’s
own nationals) under international law, unless such is
provided for through treaty. Libya did not have an
extradition treaty with either of the requesting states,
and the Montreal Convention does not oblige states in
the territory of which the alleged offender is found to
extradite the suspect. The Montreal Convention only
requires that should such state not extradite the suspect,
it must then ‘submit the case to its competent authori-
ties for the purpose of prosecution’ (the principle of aut
dedere aut judicare).35Additionally, Libya protested that
granting demand 3 (paying compensation) jeopardises
its legal position as that would imply acceptance of
responsibility for the offences, which Libya denied.
By instituting proceedings at the ICJ, Libya set in
motion the dispute-settlement mechanism provided by
the Montreal Convention on an apparent path of colli-
sion with the process started at the Security Council.
The US and the UK challenged the jurisdiction of the
ICJ on the dispute claiming, inter alia, that the matter
was not essentially about the interpretation or applica-
tion of Montreal Convention, but rather one about the
protection of the interests of the international communi-
ty. Their argument was not that the facts of the case did
not fit within the stipulations of Montreal Convention,
but rather to say, as the US put it, that the Convention
is not relevant ‘because it was not a question of “bilater-
al differences” but one of “a threat to international
peace and security resulting from State-sponsored ter-
rorism”’.36 The ICJ rejected this argument based on the
ground that the exercise of power by the Security Coun-
cil does not exclude the concurrent exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the Court on a similar matter.37 Indeed, it is
widely accepted that the ICJ and the Security Council
34. Art. 14 Montreal Convention. Libya had exhausted, as ICJ confirmed,
the options of negotiation and arbitration. Gowlland-Debbas reports,
‘Libya addressed several communications to the Security Council
requesting the cooperation of the United Kingdom and the United
States in its investigations and declaring its willingness to negotiate.’ See
UN Docs. S/23221, S/23226 (1991), and S/23396, S/23416 (1992). Its
request for arbitration is dated 18 January 1992. It also expressed its
willingness to cooperate with the Secretary-General and proposed, on
various occasions, that the two suspects be surrendered to the United
Nations, the Arab League, the judicial authorities of a third country or
an international judicial or arbitral body. See Report of the Secretary-
General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 731
(1992), UN Doc. S/23574 (1992); Further Report by the Secretary-Gen-
eral pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 731 (1992),
UN Doc. S/23672 1992)’. V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Relationship
between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in
the Light of the Lockerbie Case’, 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 44 (October 1994),
at 643. See also, E. Zubel. ‘The Lockerbie Controversy: Tension
between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council’, 5
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 1 (2010): Art. 10.
35. Art. 7 Montreal Convention, 1971. See further, M.C. Bassiouni & E.M.
Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in
International Law (1995).
36. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judg-
ment, ICJ Reports 1998, at 115, para. 23.
37. Id., paras. 27-28.
could assume concurrent jurisdiction; while the Charter
explicitly bars the General Assembly from exercising its
powers on matters that the Security Council is seized
upon, no similar inhibition was included in the Charter
with regard to the ICJ.38 So, the judicial dispute-settle-
ment venue provided by the treaties on terrorism, i.e.
the ICJ, would not be brought to a halt by the mere fact
that the Security Council is seized of the same matter.
How, then, does the increased intervention of the
Security Council on terrorism disputes weaken the trea-
ty-based dispute-settlement mechanisms? The answer
to this question consists of legal and factual considera-
tions that in combination render resort to treaty-based
dispute settlement of little consequence, while increas-
ing the appeal of resort to the Security Council venue:
the suspension of treaty rights through binding Security
Council resolutions, the unlikelihood and limited conse-
quence of a review of Security Council’s determina-
tions, and the significant disparity in expediency
between the two systems. Not least, these legal and
practical advantages are also accompanied by strong
counterterrorism policy arguments. I will use again the
Lockerbie cases to illustrate these points.
3.1 Security Council Resolutions and the
Suspension of Treaty Rights
Anticipating that military action or binding Security
Council resolutions would be taken by the US and the
UK in pursuance of their demands, Libya requested the
Court to indicate ‘provisional measures’ to protect its
claimed rights under the Montreal Convention. Of spe-
cific relevance to the measures of the Security Council,
Libya requested the Court
to ensure that no steps are taken that would prejudice
in any way the rights of Libya with respect to the
legal proceedings that are the subject of Libya's
Application.39
As anticipated, the Security Council adopted a binding
resolution, Resolution 748,40 immediately after Libya
submitted its request for provisional measures. Resolu-
tion 748 demanded that Libya ‘comply without any fur-
ther delay’ with the request under Resolution 731, by
implication the original demands forwarded by the US,
the UK, and France. It also imposed a range of military,
diplomatic, and financial sanctions on Libya, which all
member states of the United Nations were then obliged
38. Certain expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17, para. 2, of the Char-
ter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: ICJ Reports 1962, at I5I.
39. Para. 7(b), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Pro-
tection Submitted by the Government of the Socialist People’s Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 3 March 1992.
40. Adopted on 31 March 1992.
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to enforce.41 What is most important here is not the
content of the sanctions, but the fact that, through the
use of a Security Council resolution, Libya was put
under legal obligation to concede to the original
demands of the requesting states.
The ICJ is empowered, under Article 41 of its Statute,
to indicate provisional measures if it deems the later
necessary ‘to preserve the respective rights of either par-
ty’ in a dispute (emphasis added).42 The Court, howev-
er, did not grant the provisional measures that Libya
requested based on the reasoning that the rights claimed
by Libya that were meant to be protected had vanished
prima facie43 through the coming into effect of the bind-
ing Security Council resolution, Resolution 748. Libya’s
claimed rights not to extradite its two nationals had ori-
ginated from the Montreal Convention, with which
Resolution 748 came in direct contradiction by instruct-
ing Libya to extradite the two suspects. The Court rea-
soned, based on Article 103 of the Charter, which pro-
vides that member states’ obligations arising under the
Charter prevail over those arising from any other inter-
national treaty, Resolution 748 prima facie prevails over
the provisions of the Montreal Convention. As a result,
Libya’s claimed rights under the Montreal Convention
were rendered prima facie non-existent since the com-
ing into effect of Resolution 748, and so the Court rejec-
ted Libya’s request for provisional measures based on
the reasoning that there is no apparent ‘right’ to be pro-
tected. As pointed out above, states are not barred from
resorting to the treaty-based dispute-settlement mecha-
nisms; however, their rights that the treaty-based dis-
pute-settlement mechanisms are built to protect effec-
tively vanish (provisionally) once the Security Council
adopts binding measure that takes away those rights.
3.2 Unlikelihood and Limited Consequence of
Review of Security Council’s Determinations
One may still contend that in this particular case, after
the merits stage, the ICJ could find the measures of the
Security Council unlawful and uphold Libya’s rights
under the Montreal Convention. This contention is,
however, highly theoretical. The possibility of an ICJ
‘judicial review’ of the measures of the Security Council
has been a subject of intense legal debate, and I do not
intend to engage that debate in detail here. What one
41. The sanctions include the ‘denial of permission to any aircraft to take
off from, land in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or
has taken off from the territory of Libya’, prohibition of any form of
technical aviation cooperation, prohibition of transfer by any means of
‘arms and related materials of all types’ to Libya, prohibition of technical
military cooperation, the reduction of ‘the number and level of staff at
Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts’, restriction or control of
such staff, closure of Libyan Air Lines offices, and expulsion or denial of
entry of Libyan nationals involved in terrorist activities.
42. Art. 41(1) Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945.
43. The non-existence of Libya’s rights under the Montreal Convention is
prima facie in that definitive decision could only be reached after exami-
nation during the merits stage of the proceeding. The merits stage of
the proceeding, however, never came to conclusion as the case was ter-
minated in 2003 at the request of the disputing parties. International
Court of Justice, press release 2003/29, 10 September 2003. Available
at <http://www.icj-cij .org/docket/index.php?pr=168&code=lus&p1=
3&p2=3&p3=6&case=89&k=82> (last visited 20 Aug. 2013).
can safely conclude from this debate, however, is that
although the possibility for the ICJ to review the legality
of Security Council’s measures could exist, the basis of
such review is a narrow set of legal grounds. The legal
grounds that most authors agree on are the purposes
and objects of the UN,44 procedural requirements for
decision making, and the most fundamental norms of
international law (such as fundamental human rights),
including peremptory norms of international law (such
as the prohibition of genocide).45 As regards general
international law being a basis for reviewing the legality
of Security Council measures, the most generous con-
clusion is only that there is no consensus yet.
Even assuming that the ICJ could review the legality of
Security Council measures on the basis of the above-
mentioned grounds, such review would almost certainly
fall short of reinstating parties in a dispute to the origi-
nal legal positions in relation to the dispute under the
applicable treaty on terrorism. Taking the example at
hand, the effect of Resolution 748 as regards supersed-
ing Libya’s claims could only be declared unlawful if the
resolution was adopted by the Security Council in viola-
tion of the procedural (decision making) or substantive
(purpose and object of the UN, the most fundamental
norms of international law) limits on its power. If the
Security Council acts within the letters of the Charter
(which is presumed to be the case, prima facie, accord-
ing to ICJ jurisprudence46) and does not take measures
so extreme that they violate most fundamental norms of
international law, the rights of Libya under the Mon-
treal Convention remain superseded.
More importantly, even if a review of Security Coun-
cil’s resolutions takes place based on the above stan-
dards, important legal determinations contained in such
resolutions may not be affected. Security Council reso-
lutions, while operating within the broader political
mandate of the ‘maintenance of international peace and
security’, often make (implicit or explicit) factual and/
or legal determinations. Such determinations affect the
legal positions of the disputing parties under the specific
treaty governing the subject of the dispute between the
44. Art. 2(4) UN Charter.
45. See, e.g., V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Security Council Enforcement Action
and Issues of State Responsibility’, 43 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 55, at
659-661 (1994); D. Akande, ‘Old Questions and New Challenges for
the UN Security System: The Role of the Security Council in the Light of
the Charter’s Reform’, 5 Journal of Int’l Law & Policy 2 (2007); A. Ora-
khelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and
Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions’, 16 EJIL 1,
at 59-88 (2005).
46. And hence the burden of proof for a contrary allegation rests on the
one making it. See, Certain expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17,
para. 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: ICJ Reports
1962, p. I5I, at 168.
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parties.47 Often, such factual and/or legal determina-
tions have an effect such that one side of the dispute
would effectively be deprived of a better legal position
that it would have enjoyed under the specific treaty gov-
erning the subject matter of the dispute. And even if the
ICJ were to review such a Security Council resolution,
factual and/or legal determinations of the Council that
only affect the legal positions of the parties under the
otherwise applicable specific treaty would almost cer-
tainly pass unchallenged.
Assume, for example, that Resolution 748, after order-
ing Libya to comply with demand 1 (extradite the two
suspects), contained sanction measures that violate the
peremptory norms against genocide48 or the Charter
principle of the inherent right of states to self-defence.
The Court, if it would review the resolution, could only
‘outlaw’ the sanctions part of the resolution for violation
of a fundamental norm of international law or a Charter
principle, while leaving the order to comply with
demand 1 intact. This is because the order to comply
with demand 1 only violates Libya’s rights not to extra-
dite the suspects arising from the Montreal Convention.
The Montreal Convention is not a fundamental norm of
international law, but an ordinary treaty that is subject
to the supremacy of Security Council resolutions based
on Article 103 of the Charter. Hence, even if we assume
the ICJ would undertake a review of Security Council
resolutions, such review would not affect parts of the
resolutions that contain determinations bearing only on
the legal positions of the disputing parties vis-à-vis the
otherwise applicable terrorism treaty.
3.3 The Convenience and Expediency of
Decision Making by the Security Council
Equally, or even more important than the above two
legal challenges, the disparity between the Security
Council system and the treaty-based dispute-settlement
process, particularly the ICJ venue, in terms of expedi-
ency entails significant practical disadvantage for states
relying on the treaty-based alternative to solve disputes
relating to terrorism. The Security Council system is far
more expedited a process than that of the ICJ, for the
47. D. Bowett, ‘The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures’, 5 EJIL, at 89-101 (1994). Another prominent com-
mentator, Vera Gowlland-Debbas, suggests, when discussing the law
on state responsibility in particular, that concerning the ICJ and the
Security Council systems, ‘we can no longer speak of two alternative
methods of dispute settlement, the one political and the other legal, but
of two alternative processes available to states within the legal frame-
work of state responsibility: the distinction between the function of the
Court and that of the Council becomes the distinction between judicial
settlement procedures in disputes concerning responsibility and institu-
tionalized countermeasures or sanction’, V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The
Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security
Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case’, 88 Am. J. of Int’l L. 4,
at 643 (October 1994).
48. Such scenario was actually contemplated before the ICJ in the Bosnia &
Herzegovina case when a dissenting opinion held that a Security Coun-
cil resolution in question, by imposing an arms embargo, might have
exposed ‘Bosnian Muslims to genocidal activity’. Judge Lauterpacht in
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montene-
gro), Provisional Measures, 1993 ICJ Reports, at 325.
obvious reasons of procedural fairness and high degree
of formality attached to judicial proceedings. Again, the
Lockerbie cases illustrate this disparity aptly. Libya sub-
mitted its Applications and Request for Provisional
Measures to the ICJ based on the Montreal Convention
in March 1992. The Court decided on the request for
Provisional Measures about a month later, but it took
six years before the Court passed a judgment on the pre-
liminary objections to its jurisdiction. When the parties
decided to withdraw the case in September 2003, i.e.
eleven years after the initiation of the proceedings, the
Court had not yet completed the merits stage. By that
time, the Court had received the Counter-memorial
from the Respondents, Libya’s Rebuttal, and Rejoinders
from the Respondents. That meant only the completion
of the written stages of the proceedings; the oral hear-
ings and the Court’s own deliberations would have tak-
en another few years had the case not been withdrawn.
Against this time-frame comes the swift decision mak-
ing of the Security Council: in this particular case, the
binding resolution, Resolution 748, was taken only a lit-
tle more than a month after the adoption of the preced-
ing resolution, Resolution 731, and even less than a
month after Libya’s institution of the proceedings at the
ICJ (Resolution 748 was taken in haste as a response to
Libya’s legal action). Therefore, even if some remedy
would be expected of adjudication through the ICJ
(through the above-discussed narrow possibility), such
remedy comes too late. Although not a formal barrier,
this disparity in expediency has the practical effect of
discouraging resort to treaty-based dispute-settlement
procedures, particularly when states become convinced
that the Security Council venue would be malleable to
their desires.
Based on the above discussed legal and practical consid-
erations, the Security Council platform appeals as a
more efficient forum and likely to be the preferred
forum for pursuing inter-state disputes relating to ter-
rorism – provided that at least one of the disputing par-
ties sees a fair chance of succeeding through the Securi-
ty Council system or just an advantage in overshadow-
ing the treaty-based dispute-settlement process. What is
problematic is not the construal of some incidents that
fall under the different treaties on terrorism as threats to
international peace and security, but rather the possibil-
ity that virtually all incidents that fall under any of the
treaties on terrorism could be so construed. This possi-
bility – inferred through factual and legal reasoning –
appears to defeat the very purpose of devising the dis-
pute-settlement provisions of treaties on terrorism.
Treaties on terrorism deal with instances of violence
– be it bombing, hijacking, hostage taking, or their
financial and support system – that are factually within
the domain of ‘peace and security’. It is difficult to
imagine offences that fit the descriptions of the different
terrorism treaties that would not easily lend themselves
to portrayal as issues of ‘international peace and securi-
ty’; therefore, almost all of the offences covered by the
different treaties on terrorism in theory invite Security
Council’s intervention. Legally, the Security Council
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has already designated international terrorism as a threat
to international peace and security and has a corre-
sponding ongoing agenda item.49 Therefore, when the
Security Council deals with a particular dispute relating
to terrorism, it would not appear to be abusing its pow-
ers to single out and deal with an incident that manifest-
ly fails to constitute an international threat; rather, the
Council appears as merely dealing with another instance
that falls under an ongoing (broader) agenda item. In
other words, it is easier for states, particularly those that
wield strong influence on the functioning of the Securi-
ty Council, to mobilise the later for action against their
opponents in a dispute relating to terrorism by framing
the scenario as another manifestation of the ‘grave threat
of international terrorism’.
This appeal of expedient victory at the Security Council
venue, taken together with the Council’s increased con-
cern for issues of terrorism in the post-9/11 world,
entails a weakening effect on the treaty-based dispute-
settlement mechanisms. One author has predicted the
unfolding of this tendency when the Lockerbie cases were
withdrawn from the ICJ after Libya conceded to the
demands of the US, the UK and France under the force
of Security Council’s sanctions: ‘Security Council Reso-
lutions 731 and 748 […] set a precedent for the avoid-
ance of having to negotiate the jurisdictional quagmire
posited by the Montreal Convention’,50 – and this con-
clusion holds true with respect to the entire dispute-set-
tlement arrangement of any other international treaty on
terrorism.
But, of course, an increased involvement of the Security
Council in disputes relating to terrorism and the result-
ing weakening of treaty-based dispute-settlement mech-
anisms is not necessarily bad news for everyone. There
are strong policy reasons advanced in criticising the
treaty-based dispute-settlement mechanisms and
upholding the increased intervention of the Security
Council in disputes relating to terrorism as only appro-
priate in the face of increasing global security impera-
tives. I will discuss the major policy considerations
advanced in this line of argument below.
3.4 Policy Arguments for Security Council
Intervention
Practically, the slow and cumbersome dispute-settle-
ment processes provided under the treaties on terrorism
are simply unhelpful when swift response to disputes is
the only sound policy: recall the dramatic disparity in
length of time it took for the ICJ and the Security
Council to deal with the Lockerbie incident, and com-
pare the legal process at the ICJ where a state has to
49. The issue of international terrorism has since become one of the few
institutionalized permanent items on the agenda of the Council. For
example, there are only two other ad-hoc committees of general man-
date under the Security Council besides the CTC – the Committee on
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons (Res. 1540), and the Gener-
al Council of the UN Compensation Commission (Res. 692).
50. J.A. Frank, ‘A Return to Lockerbie and the Montreal Convention in the
Wake of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks: Ramifications of Past
Security Council and International Court of Justice Action’, 30 Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy 4, at 532-548, 546 (2003).
substantiate its claims with evidence to the political pro-
cess at the Security Council where evidence does not
necessarily play a (decisive) role in winning-over votes.
Where the speedy completion of the Somalia peace pro-
cess is at stake, for example, it would be unrealistic to
demand that the concerned states go through years of
legal battle to establish Eritrea’s connection to the terro-
rist groups spoiling the peace process before taking
meaningful action against it. In this case, the framing of
disputes relating to terrorism as questions of interna-
tional peace and security, and hence the taking of meas-
ures through the Security Council, would appear more
helpful, even when such measures would imply the
abrogation of certain rights that Eritrea might enjoy
under an otherwise applicable treaty regime.
A related frequently raised practical consideration is
that state involvement with or support to terrorism is
extremely difficult to prove before a court of law as it is
an extremely intricate business. Security imperatives
may demand action even in the absence of evidence that
would be sufficient and admissible before a court of law;
the later requires a high threshold of evidence and
observance of certain rules regarding the way such evi-
dence is gathered. In this light, the treaty-based dispute
settlement could be said to work to the advantage of
state parties that indirectly violate the treaties but deny
culpability. It is only sound, so this argument goes, that
the Security Council system be utilised to deny impuni-
ty to such states. Following the assassination attempt on
President Hosni Mubarak during a visit in Addis Ababa
in 1995, Ethiopian (and Egyptian) authorities accused
Sudan of sheltering the three suspects and demanded
their extradition. When Sudan denied any involvement
in the attack and any knowledge about the whereabouts
of the suspects, Ethiopia brought the matter to the
Security Council which ordered Sudan to immediately
extradite the suspects to Ethiopia and imposed sanctions
on Sudan.51 By resorting to the Security Council, Ethio-
pia circumvented the burden of having to prove the
presence of the suspects in the territory of Sudan before
the ICJ, which would have been required had the matter
been pursued based on the 1973 Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, to
which Sudan was a party by then.
In addition to these practical aspects, there is also a legal
hurdle that the Security Council venue helps overcome
in relation with disputes on terrorism. This is the case
where states are said to ‘abuse’ their rights under the
treaty regimes to openly harbour and protect suspects of
terrorism. This was precisely what was at stake in the
Lockerbie instance. The US, the UK and France were
not satisfied with Libya’s offer that it prosecute the sus-
pects in its own courts. They believed the government
of Libya itself was complicit in the crimes and therefore
the suspects would not be appropriately prosecuted. As
was mentioned earlier, the Montreal Convention provi-
ded that states in whose territory the suspect is found
51. SC Res. 1044 of 31 January 1996 and Res. 1054 of 26 April 1996.
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may refuse to extradite, in which case such state is
under obligation to – note this – ‘submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution’52
(emphasis added). The obligation is not to automatically
prosecute; the said authorities would have to determine
(depending on the margin of discretion their laws grant
them) whether and with what offence to prosecute the
suspect. Furthermore, practically speaking, even if Lib-
ya proceeded to prosecute the suspects, the US et al.
would not be convinced that ‘justice would be served’ as
they may not trust Libya’s justice system. In the face of
the problem of ‘state-sponsors’ providing refuge to ter-
rorist under the cover of treaty-based rights, so the
argument goes, it is only sensible that such matters be
dealt with through the Security Council system.
In sum, the active involvement of the Security Council
in disputes relating to terrorism is being applauded, par-
ticularly by states that wield influence on the function-
ing of the Council, for the policy reasons of timely and
expedited response and the prevention of abuse of the
treaty regimes by so called state-sponsors of terrorism.
The supremacy of the Security Council’s binding reso-
lutions over treaty obligations53 provides a strong reason
and argument for a disputing state party that secures a
more favourable outcome through the Council to frus-
trate treaty-based dispute-settlement mechanisms that
may compromise the legal or material advantages it has
obtained through the Council.
In this light, a disputing state party that would bear an
unfavourable outcome from the Security Council is in a
(potentially) devastating position as loss at the Security
Council spells loss or outright rejection at treaty-based
dispute-settlement mechanisms. It may therefore be
worthwhile to assess whether states could meaningfully
utilise the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies
dealing with terrorism as balanced platforms of disputa-
tion where the outcome is contingent on the weighing of
the contesting claims of all sides. The next section will
show that such possibility is highly unlikely.
4 Inter-state Disputation
Within the Security Council
System
4.1 Disputation Within the Security Council
The Security Council appears to provide a platform for
inter-state disputation, but there is less than meets the
eye. True, the working procedures of the Security
Council allow for the hearing of all parties to a dispute,
allowing them to propose agenda items or draft resolu-
tions and participate in the proceedings of the
52. Art. 7 Montreal Convention, 1971.
53. According to Art. 103 of the UN Charter.
Council.54 And any state, regardless of its membership
of the UN, would be invited to participate in the meet-
ings of the Security Council, without vote, ‘if it is a par-
ty to a dispute under consideration by the Council’55;
and any member state of the UN would likewise be invi-
ted ‘if it brings a matter to the attention of the Council’,
regardless of being a party to the dispute.56 Even when
not invited, states can forward their views and claims to
the Security Council through the Secretariat or the
General Assembly.57
However, these possibilities at the Security Council
hardly provide a balanced platform where the outcome
would depend on the relative weight of the competing
arguments. At least two main reasons support this con-
tention: the lack of evidentiary or legal standards con-
straining the Security Council’s discretion, and the
entrenchment of fixed political interests through the
veto power of the five Permanent Members of the
Council (the P5). The first issue has more impact after
the Security Council determines that a dispute is likely
to give rise to or already constitutes a threat to interna-
tional peace and security, as it would then be authorised
to impose any terms of settlement ‘as it may consider
appropriate’58 or coercive enforcement measures under
Chapter VII of the Charter. The Security Council is
bestowed with a wide margin of discretion in making
these determinations, and taking subsequent measures.
There are no compulsory evidentiary or legal considera-
tions that the Security Council has to fulfil in order to
reach its decisions: the only determinant factor is the
agreement of sufficient number of members of the
Council (and non-objection of any of the P5), which is
essentially a matter of political negotiation.
The Security Council is not required to substantiate its
decision with (a degree of) evidence. When the Security
Council endorsed the accusations of the US, the UK
and France against Libya through Resolution 731, for
example, it neither demanded the presentation of evi-
dence, nor presented its decision as being backed by the
weight of evidence. The same is true as regards legal
54. States can bring an issue to the attention of the Security Council
through the Secretariat (Rule 6 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the
Security Council), through the General Assembly (Rule 3), or directly
when invited by the Council to participate in a meeting (Rule 38). Note
that the permanent members of the Security Council cannot exercise
their veto power for procedural matters, i.e., an agenda cannot be
vetoed away from consideration by the Council, Art. 27(2) UN Charter.
55. Art. 32 UN Charter.
56. Rule 37, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. Based
on its power to determine its rules of procedure, the Security Council
has restricted the participation of non-Council members to only formal
meetings: such states would not be allowed to participate or would par-
ticipate only upon invitation in the ‘informal’ consultations and dia-
logues on the matter. The ‘private–public’ distinction regarding the
meetings of the Council should not be conflated with the ‘formal–infor-
mal’ distinction: the former distinction is based on whether the meeting
or records of it are publicly accessible, while the later distinction is based
on the presence or absence of official records and formalized proce-
dures during the meeting. A private meeting of the Council (closed to
the public) could, therefore, still be a formal meeting. See, Note by the
President of the Security Council, S/2010/507.
57. Rules 3 and 6, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council.
58. Art. 37(2) UN Charter.
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standards. It does not (should not) necessarily matter to
the Security Council which party to the dispute has
(claimed) what legal rights (except, arguably, for those
that would be inferred from the purpose and objects of
the UN, and the fundamental norms of international
law, as discussed earlier). Or, to put it more appropri-
ately, disputing parties have no entitlement to have their
(claimed) legal rights observed or even given due con-
sideration. This does not mean these states do not have
the right to present those claims; it rather means there is
no requirement in its rules of procedure that forces the
Security Council to give due consideration to those
claims or motivate its decisions in light of those claims.
The issue here is not that the Security Council operates
on political considerations instead of legal – if such dis-
tinction could ever be maintained – but that there are no
mechanisms in the decision-making process of the
Security Council that disputing parties could utilise to
automatically trigger procedural or substantive consid-
erations attuned to their legal claims.
The fact that the decision of the Security Council could
be swayed to whichever way one manages to pull the
requisite political consensus, however, does not mean
outcome is always contingent upon the balance of per-
suasion. To the contrary, due to the factor of the veto
power of the P5, outcome is highly predetermined: out-
come that any of the P5 would be oppose to will not
materialise. Precisely for this reason, disputing states
resort to the Security Council only when they desire to
simply register their positions (thus not expecting out-
come) or when they actually anticipate victory. There
could be exceptions, there could be change of positions
once the Security Council proceedings are under way,
but as a matter of general practice, there are hardly in-
between cases where disputing parties submit their cases
before the Security Council and eagerly await for an
unpredictable outcome, or an outcome contingent on
the weight of their arguments. Such is a manifestation
of ‘false contingency’ – to borrow the term that Susan
Marks uses in a Marxian critique of international legal
scholarship59 – that processes appear neutral and their
outcomes seem contingent on the relative weight of
competing arguments, but in fact yield consistently pre-
determined outcomes. While the subsidiary bodies of
the Security Council do not pretend to entertain ques-
tions other than those of enforcement (as will be shown
below), the process at the Security Council allows for
the hard questions to float, but the answers to them are
predetermined, or more precisely, determined not by
‘the weight of the better argument’ but by their con-
formity with the desires of the P5.
4.2 The Subsidiary Bodies of the Security
Council
The subsidiary bodies of the Security Council that deal
with terrorism are the Counter Terrorism Committee
(CTC), the different Sanctions Committees, and the
59. S. Marks, ‘False contingency’, 62 Current Legal Problems 1, at 1-21
(2009).
expert bodies working under both. The mandates of
these subsidiary bodies are ‘managerial’ by design: they
subsume the premise that what constitutes a problem is
already decided (elsewhere) and the task at hand is the
effective management of the problem.60 The subsidiary
bodies come into existence to implement decisions of the
Security Council, thus including the (implicit) determi-
nation of rights and obligations constituting the core of
the dispute, as discussed earlier. This exclusive devotion
to matters of execution is best reflected in the working
of the Sanctions Committees, which are established to
oversee the effective implementation of the enforcement
measures on whoever is regarded by the Security Coun-
cil as the ‘guilty party’ in a dispute. Along with the
imposition of the sanctions on Libya through Resolution
748, such committee was established to receive and
examine state reports on compliance, to track and dis-
seminate information on violation of the sanctions, to
‘recommend appropriate measures in response to [such]
violations’.61 The Sanctions Committee on Libya, as all
other sanctions committees, may decide on Libya’s or
other actor’s specific request for leniency or deference
on the implementation of the sanctions, for humanitari-
an reasons or ‘specific economic problems’ within spe-
cific parameters defined by the Security Council.62 But
that is it; a Sanctions Committee cannot engage in legal,
political or factual assessment on the validity of the
sanctions themselves, and the implicit legal determina-
tions attached thereto. Therefore, before the Sanctions
Committee, Libya can only present requests relating to
the manner or extent of implementation of the sanc-
tions; entertaining challenges to the validity of the sanc-
tions simply falls beyond the mandate of the Sanctions
Committee.
The CTC is a curious arrangement, possessing a broad-
er mandate than the Sanctions Committees, but none-
theless curtailed within similar ‘managerial’ confines of
the implementation of Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540
(2005).63 Unlike the Sanctions Committees, the CTC
does not oversee the implementation of a specific
enforcement measures on specific actors, but rather
works with states and other international actors in pro-
moting legal, policy, and practical measures on terror-
ism in general. Resolution 1373 instructs states to take
steps towards the criminalisation and suppression of
financing of terrorism, criminalisation and suppression
of support to terrorism, cooperation in information
exchange, and legal and criminal matters, while Resolu-
tion 1540 deals with the criminalisation and suppression
of incitement to terrorism. The task of the CTC is, sim-
60. More on managerialism in international law, see, e.g., M. Koskenniemi,
‘International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism, and the Ethos of
Legal Education’, I European Journal of Legal Studies, at 1 (2007); ‘The
Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’, 20 EJIL 1, at 7-19
(2009).
61. Para. 9, Res. 748.
62. Para. 9(e)(f), Res. 748.
63. The CTC was established through Res. 1373 in 2001; later, the imple-
mentation of Resolution 1540 was entrusted upon the CTC. Since
2004, the work of the CTC is assisted by an Executive Directorate
(CTED), see SC Res. 1535 of 26 March 2004.
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ply put, to serve as a nucleus of international coopera-
tion on the above-mentioned objectives: its dealing with
states is limited to steering them towards the implemen-
tation of the necessary legislative, policy, and practical
measures on terrorism in general, and not on specific
incidents. This task of the CTC is undertaken through
country visits, state-reporting systems, coordination of
technical support, compilation and dissemination of best
practices, and organisation of special meetings to syn-
chronise the work of multiple international actors.64
These different working methods of the CTC are essen-
tially designed to assess and respond to what states are
doing in response to Resolutions 1373 and 1540, what
they are not doing, what some have done better, and
what assistance others may require to implement those
better practices. As could be gleaned from these work-
ing methods, the essence of the mandate of the CTC is
mobilising and assisting states towards the elimination
of a shared problem that is terrorism. The grand rule
concerning the positioning of states towards each other
is cooperation: that all states are to act in solidarity with
each other in the face of a universal threat, and the CTC
is there to help realise such solidarity, not to entertain
inter-state ‘squabble’ that detracts from momentum.65
The CTC’s dealings with a state focuses on the activi-
ties of that state only and do not lend themselves to the
hearing of inter-state complaints; other states would be
brought into this equation only to the extent that they
offer best practices or assistance in counterterrorism.
The experience of some states that tried to use the state
reporting system66 to voice inter-state complaints illus-
trates this. For example, in most of its reports on Reso-
lution 1373, Cuba forwarded a list of charges particular-
ly against the US, alleging that the latter harbours
Cuba’s most wanted terrorists.67 Azerbaijan also used its
reports to level strong accusations of sponsorship of ter-
rorism against its neighbour Armenia. In Armenia,
Azerbaijna claimed, ‘terrorism has been raised to the
status of state policy’.68 Regarding an alleged terrorist
group headed by a certain Gaji Mahomedovich
64. Further, see website of the CTC, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/> (last
visited 27 Sep. 2013).
65. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the first president of the CTC stated unequivo-
cally, in an interview with the BBC on 28 October 2001: ‘our job in the
Counter Terrorism Committee is to upgrade the legislation and the
executive machinery of every state in the UN who is willing but perhaps
not so capable of dealing with terrorist finance, a safe haven for terror-
ism and other actions against terrorism…. the Counter Terrorism Com-
mittee is there not to define terrorism but to upgrade the capability of
states to deal with it when they find it … My committee is not going to
get into the business of judging who is a terrorist or whether something
is a terrorist act ...’, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/otr/intext/
20011028_int_3.html> (last visited 27 Sep. 2013).
66. Reports on the implementation of Res. 1373, and later also Res. 1540.
67. See, Letters from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United
Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee
established pursuant to Res. 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism,
dated 27 December 2001 (S/2002/15), 24 September 2002
(S/2002/1093) and 27 August 2003 (S/2003/838).
68. Letter from the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of Azerbai-
jan to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) con-
cerning counter-terrorism, dated 27 December 2001 (S/2001/1325).
Mahomed, Azerbaijan reported to the CTC that the
group’s operatives had ‘undergone training in the terri-
tory of the Republic of Armenia’.69 In both instances,
the CTC simply avoided responding to the inter-state
accusations. Even after repeated reminders in subse-
quent reports, the CTC did not respond to those allega-
tions. Whether those allegations were reported out of
the need to ventilate frustrations or with serious expect-
ation of redress, the CTC’s lack of response fits well
with the observation that the CTC system is a mecha-
nism for cooperation and does not entertain inter-state
disputes.
It is possible to conclude, therefore, that little meaning-
ful platform for inter-state disputation exists within
both the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies: the
former offering illusive possibilities and the later avoid-
ing any such pretence altogether.
5 Summary and Final Remarks
In the past two decades, and even more so after the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Security Coun-
cil has become a more active nucleus of international
legal and policy counterterrorism undertakings. This
has also meant an increased intervention of the Security
Council in inter-state disputes relating to terrorism.
Since the 2009 sanctions mentioned at the beginning,
the Security Council has subjected Eritrea to additional
sanctions70 in response to the accusations of Ethiopia
and Djibouti that Eritrea sponsors terrorist attacks in
their territories.71 As the Libya case demonstrates, even
if Eritrea was a party to relevant international treaties
such as the Terrorist Financing Convention, the Securi-
ty Council path proves more attractive to Ethiopia and
Djibouti, given that Eritrea is already on the ‘black list’
of powerful members of the Council (the Western P5
states). As opposed to the sense of routine and restraint
represented by ‘treaty-based dispute settlement’, resort
to the Security Council is accompanied by a sense of
extreme exigency (‘international peace and security’)
that presumably justifies bypassing ‘frustrating’ treaty-
based procedures and the taking of swift and strong
measures.
69. Letter from the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of Azerbai-
jan to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) con-
cerning counter-terrorism, on 31 October 2003 (S/2003/1085).
70. SC Res. 2023, 5 December 2011. These new sanctions targeted the
financial sources of the Eritrean government, by imposing restrictions on
its lucrative mining sector and prohibiting the collection of so called
‘Diaspora tax’ from Eritreans living abroad.
71. See, Letter dated 18 January 2012 from the Permanent Representative
of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, S/2012/44; Verbatim record of the 6674th meeting of
the Security Council, agenda ‘peace and security in Africa’, 5 December
2011, S/PV.6674. These accusations were partly corroborated by
reports of the expert team monitoring the implementation of the 2009
sanctions. See, Letter dated 18 July 2011 from the Chairman of the
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and
1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President
of the Security Council, S/2011/433.
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Resort to the treaty-based dispute-settlement mecha-
nisms such as the ICJ is of little help as the Security
Council resolutions prima facie pervade its treaty rights,
and if the unlikely judicial review of such resolutions
materialises, it provides too little too late. Equally dis-
tressing for states in the position of Eritrea is the fact
that the Security Council system does not provide an
even platform for inter-state disputation. It is admitted
that in most disputes, an outcome at the Security Coun-
cil is the function of the relative political support that
the opposing sides garner. The playing field is more
decidedly uneven for states such as Eritrea – states that
are considered ‘reclusive’ by the Western P5 members.
In relation to the issue of terrorism, ‘reclusive’ are those
states that fall outside the global circle of counterterror-
ism solidarity, which is embodied and coordinated by
the Security Council and spearheaded by the Western
(P5) states. States that do not partake in this counterter-
rorism solidarity find themselves in a difficult position:
on the one hand they are urged by the Security Council
to become parties to the international treaties on terror-
ism, and on the other their resort to the dispute-settle-
ment mechanisms of these treaties subverted and ren-
dered inconsequential by the actions of the same Coun-
cil. An active Security Council in the era of counterter-
rorism spells lack of peaceful means of disputation for
these states as they become trapped between a hostile
Security Council and an unhelpful treaty-based mecha-
nism: caught between a rock and a hard place.
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